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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 20290

-vLAWRENCE PITTS,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
The defendant, Lawrence Pitts, was charged by
information with Burglary, a felony of the Third Degree, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended.

After

a trial by jury on September 25 and 26, 1984 in the Third
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, presiding,
defendant was found guilty of Burglary.

On September 26, 1984,

defendant was sentenced to the indeterminate term as provided by
law of zero to five years in the Utah State Penitentiary.
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
On August 4, 1984, sometime after noon and before store
closing time at 1:00 a.m., some blank checks and an envelope
containing a bank statement and endorsed checks were stolen from
a Handy Pantry convenience store in Salt Lake City (T. 14, 15).
The items were taken from an office in the back room, which is
off limits to the public (T. 22). The door to the back room is
generally kept open except when Preston Tholen, the store owner,
is working in his office (T. 13) and the door was open during the

time in question on August 4 (T. 14) . On each side of the door
a sign is posted which states "Employees only.
prosecuted.

Others will be

Management." (T. 13). This sign is clearly visible

to anyone walking down the store aisle toward the back room (T.
17, 119).
The bank statement had been delivered that day and an
employee had put it on top of the owner's desk (T. 10-11).

The

blank checks were kept hidden in an envelope in the back of a
small carry box under the desk (T. 24, 31). Although four blank
checks and the envelope containing the bank statement were
recovered, five blank checks and thirty to forty of the endorsed
checks from the statement were never recovered by the police (T.
24, 31, 33). The five blank checks were forged against the store
owner and later returned by the bank (T. 32).
Two Handy Pantry employees, Valerie Swaner and Creed
Anderson, saw defendant in the store around 7:00 p.m. on August 4
(T. 36). Defendant's common-law wife, Ordena Longton, testified
that on that evening she, defendant, and another woman drove to
Handy Pantry in her yellow Datsun to buy some formula for her
baby (T. 51-53).

Defendant and the unidentified other woman went

into the store while Ms. Longton made a telephone call (T. 53).
As the defendant, Ms. Longton and the woman drove away from the
store, Ms. Longton noticed that defendant had an envelope similar
to the one later identified as being stolen from the Handy Pantry
(T. 54-55).

When she asked defendant about the envelope, he told

her it contained checks and that "they weren't for him, that
somebody else could use them" (T. 55-56).

Defendant then took

Ms. Longton home and left in her car (T. 56-57).
-2-

At about 11:00 p.m. that night defendant drove to the
home of Sharon Spencer in Ms. Longton1s yellow Datsun (T. 72).
While defendant and Ms. Spencer had a conversation in the car,
Ms. Spencer saw an envelope similar to the stolen one between the
driver and passenger seats (T. 13). When she reached for the
envelope, defendant moved it away from herf either onto his lap
or by his side (T. 74). He later carried the envelope with him
into Ms. Spencer1s house (T. 75, 81). Both Ms. Spencer and her
roommate Merna Norwick testified that defendant watched
television at their house for a few hours and then fell asleep on
the couch with the envelope in front of him on the coffee table
(T. 75-76, 83).

In the morning defendant, the envelope and the

yellow Datsun were gone (T. 76, 84).
On the morning of August 5, police office David Rowley
was looking for defendant as part of an investigation of a theft
reported by Sharon Spencer (T. 104-105).

He was also looking for

the yellow Datsun which was involved in a "breach of trust11
reported by Ordena Longton (T. 63, 104-105).

He located both

defendant and the Datsun at Second North and Fifth West in Salt
Lake City, (T. 104-105).

The checks and the bank statement were

found in the glove compartment of Ms. Longton1s Datsun (T. 93).
Defendant denied any knowledge of the checks, but Ms. Longton
told the police that defendant had come out of the Handy Pantry
in possession of the checks and that defendant knew someone who
could "pass the checks for thousands" (T. 103, 110). The police
contacted Preston Tholen and determined that the bank statement
and the checks had been taken from the store and defendant was

-3-

then charged with burglary (T. 100-101).

At trial, after a

little over an hour of deliberation, the jury found defendant
guilty of burglary.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court did not err in denying defendants
request for a jury instruction regarding theft as a lesser
included offense of burglary.

The two offenses are not

sufficiently related for theft to be considered included in
burglary.

They protect entirely different interests, proof of

theft is not generally presented as part of the showing of the
commission of burglary, and they address competely separate acts.
Theft merely serves on occasion as circumstantial evidence of an
element of burglary.

Moreover, there was not a sufficient

quantum of evidence to provide a rational basis for acquitting
defendant of burglary and convicting him of theft.

Defendant

presented no evidence to support his theory of the case; he
merely asserts on appeal that the sign prohibiting entry into the
back room was not noticeable and that therefore his entry was
licensed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

holding that the back room was clearly not open to the public and
that defendant was not entitled to a lesser included offense jury
instruction.
The trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss the charge of burglary for the State's failure
to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.
The State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of
defendant's entry into the back room.
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Defendant's entry was

shown to be unlawful because there was uncontroverted evidence of
a sign prohibiting entry and that the store's owner did not allow
the public into the back room*

Furthermore, since at trial

defendant did not attempt to assert that he assumed that he had
consent or explain away the evidence that no consent existed in
fact, the State had no obligation to prove his state of mind.
Defendant's possession of the stolen property along with his lies
about that possession served as sufficient evidence of his intent
to commit a theft at the time of his unlawful entry*
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON THEFT AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF BURGLARY WAS CORRECT.
At trial, defendant requested that instructions be
given on theft as a lesser included offense of burglary.

The

court refused this request, and defendant objected (T. 166-167).
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court's refusal to
give the instructions constitutes reversible error.

Defendant

relies on the recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Bakerf
Utah, 671 P.2d 152 (1983), to support his claim.
In £j£Lkj£X, this Court addressed the Utah lesser included
offense statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (1953) as
amended, which provides:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged.
-5-

This Court set forth two different standards to be applied when a
lesser included offense instruction is requested.

When the

prosecution requests the instruction the trial court should use
the "necessarily included offense" standard to determine if the
instruction should be given.

This strict standard requires a

comparison of the abstract statutory elements of the offenses,
and is necessary to ensure that the defendant has had notice of
and opportunity to defend against the lesser offense:

"his

defense against the greater will of necessity, be a defense
against the lesser also, with regard to both the law and the
facts alleged."

£ak£j:, at 156. When the defendant requests the

instruction, however, the court should apply the more flexible
evidence-based standard.

The Court expressed concern that

without the option of convicting of a lesser offense, when an
element of the charged offense is in doubt but the defendant is
plainly guilty of some offense, the jury may opt to convict
rather than to fulfill its duty to acquit.

This more lenient

standard is therefore necessary to afford the defendant the full
benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.
Under the evidence-based analysis, a two-pronged test
must be met before a defendant is entitled to a lesser included
offense instruction.

First, the trial court must determine if

the "two offenses are related because some of their statutory
elements overlap and . . . [if] the evidence at the trial of the
greater offense includes proof of some or all of those
overlapping elements . . . " Hakex at 159.
offense is included in the greater.
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If so, the lesser

Second, the court must

determine if Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1953) as amended is
satisfied, i.e., if "there is a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense.11

In the present case, defendant was

not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction regarding
theftf because neither prong of the BaKex test was met.
A.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A JURY
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THEFT AS A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY BECAUSE
THE TOO OFFENSES ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY
RELATED TO BE CONSIDERED INCLUDED.

Defendant claims that there is a statutory overlap of
the two offenses of burglary and theft and that therefore the
first prong of the EaJuej: test is met.

The elements of burglary,

as charged in this case, are:
1)

entering or remaining in a building or any portion

of a building
2)

doing so unlawfully

3)

doing so intentionally or knowingly

4)

doing so with the intent to commit a theft

(see jury instruction #19, Appendix)
The elements of theft are:
1)

exercising unauthorized control over the property

2)

doing so with the intent to deprive the owner of

of another

the property
(see defendant's requested instruction #4, Appendix).
Although defendant frames the issue somewhat differently, his
argument is essentially that since he was charged with a
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variation of burglary that proscribes entering or remaining
unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a theft, the
statutory elements of theft and burglary overlap.

He further

claims that this overlap is sufficient to satisfy the second
prong of fiakfij:.
This analysis involves only a superficial comparison of
the language constituting the statutes describing the two
offenses, and is a misapplication of the ILaJuex standard.
Although it is true that an insignificant statutory overlap does
exist, the central elements of the two offenses are entirely
different and do not overlap.

The gravamen of burglary is the

unlawful entering or remaining in a building, and the element of
intent to commit theft merely amounts to the equivalent of an
aggravating circumstance raising to burglary the less serious
unlawful entry or remaining proscribed by criminal trespass.
Theft, a crime involving the taking of another's property, is
simply not inherently related to burglary.

The two offenses

protect different interests and are committed by completely
different acts.

Traditionally, the State has been able to charge

a defendant with both offenses when intent to commit a theft
underlies the burglary and a theft is completed during the same
criminal episode.

(See, e.g. Rogerson v. Harris. Ill Utah 330,

178 P.2d 397 (1947), State v. Jones. 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262
(1962) .
In Baker, this Court warned against using the sort of
analysis urged here by defendant to find two such unrelated
offenses included:
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This requirement that there exist some overlap
in the statutory elements of allegedly "included"
offenses would prevent the argument that totally
unrelated offenses could be deemed included
simply because some of the evidence necessary to
prove one crime was also necessary to prove the
other. For example, evidence proving theft in
a trial involving only a charge of first degree
homicide would not make theft a lesser included
offense under § 76-1-402(3)(a) because none of
the statutory elements of theft and homicide overlap.
£aJi£X at 159.
Defendant's mechanistic and superficial comparison of the
language of the two statutes without regard to the true nature of
the offenses they describe would allow unrelated offenses to be
deemed included if the lesser offense were incidentally proved in
the course of proving the greater.

Since Baker this Court has

not further elaborated on how extensive a statutory overlap must
be to meet the first prong of Baker,

However, other

jurisdictions interpreting evidence-based standards similar to
that set forth in Baker have developed a method of statutory
comparison that is consistent with the policies underlying the
lesser included offense doctrine.

These courts have identified

several factors to be considered in determining when two offenses
are sufficiently related for the lesser to be deemed included in
the greater.
In United States v. Whitaker. 447 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cited several times in fiakeXr the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court to analyze the
difference between the two standards to be used in determining
when a lesser included offense instruction is warranted.
Whitaker had requested a jury instruction regarding unlawful
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entry as a lesser included offense of burglary.

The trial court

denied the request, holding that unlawful entry was not a lesser
included offense of burglary.

The court reasoned that the

offense of unlawful entry required the element of entry without
authority and against the will of the lawful occupant, while
certain variations of burglary did not require the entry to be
unlawful for conviction.

The Court of Appeals reversed, stating

that since the evidence showed that the defendant's entry had
indeed been unauthorized, "it is unrealistic and artificial, on
the statute involved, the indictment, and the proof in this case
to deny a lesser included offense instruction on unlawful entry."
Whitaker at 320.

Thus the strict "necessarily included offense"

analysis employed by the trial court had been inappropriate.
Since the defendant rather than the prosecution had requested the
instruction,a more natural and realistic evidence-based standard
should have been used.

The trial court should have given the

jury instructions if the lesser offense had been established by
the evidence presented at trial in proof of the greater offense.
However, the court added a caveat that:
there must also be an "inherent" relationship
between the greater and lesser offenses,
i.e., they must relate to the protection of
the same interests, and must be so related
that in the general nature of these crimes,
though not necessarily invariably, proof of
the lesser offense is necessarily presented
as part of the showing of the commission of
the greater offense. This latter stipulation
is prudently required to foreclose a tendency
which might otherwise develop towards misuse
by the defense of such rule. In the absence
of such restraint defense counsel might be
tempted to press the jury for leniency by
requesting lesser included offense
instructions on every lesser crime that could
-10-

arguably be made out from any evidence that
happened to be introduced at trial. "An
element of the mercy-dispensing power is
doubtless inherent in the jury system, and
may well be a reason why a defendant seeks a
lesser included offense instruction, but it
is not by itself a permissible basis to
justify such an instruction."
Whitaker at 319f citing
Kelly v. United States,
125 U.S. App. D.C. at
207, 370 F.2d at 229
(1966).
This warning mirrors the Baker court's concern that this more
lenient evidence-based standard might be abused.

Moreover, the

"inherent relationship" test is designed to protect against the
same possible abuses by defense counsel that prompted the Baker
court to require that the two offenses be "related".

Therefore,

the "inherent relationship" test, as it is employed in Whitaker
and in later cases applying WhitakerP is helpful in determining
the parameters of the "relationship" required by the Baker
evidence-based analysis.
The Whitaker court found that there was an inherent
relationship between the two offenses of burglary and unlawful
entry since "the criminal activity proscribed by the two offenses
violates the same interest - that of the property owner in
protecting the integrity of his premises"

Whitaker at 319.

Various state and federal jurisidctions have adopted
the "inherent relationship" test.

Several of these courts have

applied the test to two allegedly related offenses and determined
that one offense was not a lesser included offense of the other.
In Ballard v, United States, 430 A.2d 483 (D.C. App. 1981), the
defendant had been charged with both rape and carnal knowledge and
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appealed, claiming that carnal knowledge was a lesser included
offense of rape and that therefore he should not have been charged
with both offenses.

This was not a case where the defendant had

requested a lesser included offense jury instruction.
Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied
the "inherent relationship" test.

The court reasoned that since

the interest violated by the offense of rape is the injury to the
feelings of the victim by the forceful violation of her person,
and the interest violated by the offense of carnal knowledge is
the sexual innocence of females below the age of sixteen, carnal
knowledge is not a lesser included offense of rape.

Similarly, in

People v. May, 91 111.2d 251, 437 N.E.2d 633 (1982), the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's rape conviction and held
that he had not been entitled to a jury instruction on battery by
bodily harm as a lesser included offense because the two offenses
did not have an inherent relationship and protected different
interests.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States

v. Zangr 703 F.2d 1186 (1982), held that regulatory violations
were not lesser included offenses of conspiracy, mail or wire
fraud or racketeering, since the elements, proof and interests
protected differed greatly.
Two recent Washington cases are especially similar to
the present case.

In both cases the defendants had requested jury

instructions regarding possession of stolen property as a lesser
included offense of burglary.

Although in each case the courts

purported not to use the "inherent relationship" test, they
effectively applied that test in reaching the conclusion that the two
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offenses were not included.

In State v. Chelly, 32 Wash. App. 916

651 P.2d 759 (1982)f despite the defendant's argument that his
possession of the stolen property was the only direct evidence to
connect him with the burglary, the Washington Court of Appeals
stated that "we do not believe that possession of stolen property
is so closely related to burglary as to make it a lesser included
offense . . . "

£h£ll£ at 762.

In State v. Johnson, 100 Wash.2d

607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983), the Washington Supreme Court also
declined to apply the "inherent relationship" test in a similar
case because:
[elven federal cases have applied the
"inherent relationship" test only to lesser

offenses which were in fact part of the same
.act . . . [h]eref in contrast, the possession
of stolen property was an act entirely
subsequent to the unlawful entry with intent
to commit theft which constituted the

burglary. The mere fact that evidence of the
former offense was used to circumstantially
prove the latter does not make it a lesser
included offense*
Johnson at 158.

(emphasis added)

Thus, when the Baker standard is viewed in the context
of similar standards in other jurisdictions, its true purpose and
limits emerge.

The original distinction, made in Whitaker,

between the "necessarily included" standard and the "evidence
based" standard was designed to avoid the unfair result reached
under a purely technical analysis - that simply because the lesser
offense was not included in every variation of the greater
offense, the defendant was never entitled to a jury instruction on
the lesser offense.

On the other hand, the fact that the

defendant has a more lenient standard to meet when requesting a
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lesser included offense jury instruction does not mean he should
be allowed to abuse that leniency by demanding "that totally
unrelated offenses be deemed included simply because some of the
evidence necessary to prove one crime was also necessary to prove
the other."

Baker at 159.

Therefore an evidence-based analysis

should go further than a superficial comparison of the elements of
the statutes describing the allegedly related offenses.

Rather,

the factors specified in Whitaker and in the cases following it
should be considered in addition to the statutory elements in
determining whether the offenses are sufficiently related for the
lesser to be deemed included in the greater.

Thusf the court

should consider whether the interests violated by the two offenses
are the same, whether in the general nature of the crimes proof of
the lesser is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the
commission of the greater offense, and whether the two offenses
are part of the same act.

In addition, the court should be aware

of the fact that simply because commission of the lesser offense
is circumstantial evidence of the greater offense does not mean
that the lesser is included in the greater.

An analysis using

these factors will produce a sounder and more realistic
interpretation of the Baker standard than does the analysis urged
by defendant.
In the case at bar, no "inherent relationship" exists
between the offenses of burglary and theft.

The interest violated

by burglary is that of "the security of habitation or occupancy,
rather than ownership or property" 3 Wharton's Criminal Law, § 3 26
(C. Torcia 14th ed. 1980).

Conversely, the interest violated by
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theft is that of "the right of property or possession" Id. § 354
(Cf. Smith v. United States, 418 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ,
where the United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit
recognized this difference between the two offenses in noting that
cumulative sentences were allowed for robbery (an offense closely
related to theft) and housebreaking (an offense closely related to
burglary).

The court described robbery and housebreaking as

"crimes of historically different conception, protecting
distinctly different societal interests, and affording protection
against markedly different dangers.")

Furthermore, it is not true

that in the general nature of the crimes of burglary and theft,
proof of theft is necessarily presented as part of the showing of
the commission of burglary.

The offense of burglary is committed

if the actor enters or remains unlawfully in a building or part of
a building with the intent to commit assault or any felony as well
as with the intent to commit theft.

Accordingly, proof of intent

to commit assault rather than theft can be part of the showing of
the commission of burglary, State v. Nebeker, Utah, 657 P.2d 1360
(1983), as well as proof of intent to commit a felony such as
arson. State v- Smith, Utah, 621 P.2d 697 (1980).

Further, intent

to commit a theft can be shown without proof of a completed theft
State v. Clements. 26 Utah 298, 488 P.2d 1044 (1921).

generally, Rogerson v. Harris,

SIISXA,

(£££

and State Vt Jones, .sucta.)

The two offenses address two entirely separate acts; burglary
addresses unlawful entry or remaining and theft addresses the
unauthorized control over the property of another.

Clearly then,

there is no inherent relationship between the offenses of theft
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and burglary,.

Therefore the trial court was correct in denying

defendant's requested jury instruction

since granting the request

would have condoned exactly the misuse by defendant against which
the Whitaker and £aJi£i: courts warned.
The State must concede that the "inherent relationship"
test for which it argues above is not supported by this court's
recent decision in State v. Brown, Utah, 694 P.2d 587 (1984).
In BxsMn,

this Court held in a j^ar curiam decision that the trial

court should have granted the defendant's request for a jury
instruction regarding simple assault as a lesser included offense
of aggravated kidnapping.

The elements of the offenses that were

relevant in light of the evidence were:
Utah Code Ann.f § 76-5-102 (1953) as amended.
(1)

Assault.

Assault is:

(a) An attempt, with unlawful force
or violence, to do bodily injury to
another; or
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show
of immediate force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1953) as amended.

Aggravated

Kidnapping.
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping
[sic] when he intentionally or knowingly
by force, threat or deceit, detains or
restrains another against his will with intent:
• • • .

(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to
terrorize victim or another; . . . .
In its analysis, this Court merely said the first prong of Baker
was met because "some" overlap existed in the definitions of the
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two offenses "as a comparison of the elements of assault and
kidnapping . . . shows" ajLQMJlf at 589-90.

However, when the

"inherent relationship" test is applied, it can be seen that
although some superficial statutory overlap does exist, the two
offenses of aggravated kidnapping and assault are unrelated.

No

inherent relationship exists between the offenses of assault and
aggravated kidnapping.

The interests violated by the two offenses

are completely different.

The offense of kidnapping violates the

victim1s interest in freedom of movement, while the offense of
assault violates the victim's interest in his physical safety and
freedom from bodily harm.
acts.

The two offenses address different

The gravamen of kidnapping is the act of unlawful restraint

while the gravamen of assault is the act of threatening or
attempting to inflict bodily harm on another.

Additionally, in

Brown the assault statute overlaps with only the aggravating
portion of the aggravating kidnapping statute.

Therefore, the

Brown holding that assault is included in aggravated kidnapping
results in the anomalous situation that a defendant charged with
the more serious crime of aggravated kidnapping may be entitled to
a lesser included offense instruction regarding assault, while if
he had been charged with the less serious offense of simple
kidnapping he would not be entitled to the instruction.

This

result is illogical, but inevitably follows from the interpretation of the Baker standard used in BXSMH and urged by
defendant in the present case.

Respondent urges this Court to

abandon the sort of analysis used in Brown for this and any future
case, and to adopt the more appropriate "inherent relationship"
test.
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B.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
A JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THEFT
AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
BURGLARY BECAUSE A SUFFICIENT
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE DID NOT EXIST
TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR A
VERDICT ACQUITTING HIM OF BURGLARY
AND CONVICTING HIM OF THEFT.

Even if theft were closely enough related to burglary
to be considered a lesser included offense, the trial court would
not be obligated to give a lesser included offense instruction
unless in the evidence adduced at trial "there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the lesser offense.11
402(4) (1953) as amended.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-

Defendant claims that there was a

rational basis for a verdict acquitting him of burglary and
convicting him of theft.

Defendant's argument is that unlawful

entry into a portion of a building is an element required for
conviction of burglary (see jury instruction #19, Appendix) and
that there is evidence that his entry was licensed and therefore
lawful.

Defendant contends that on the basis of this evidence the

jury "may have concluded that Mr. Pitts was merely guilty of
wandering to the bathroom and stealing checks along the way"
(Appellant1s brief at 8) and that he was therefore guilty of theft
rather than burglary.
In support of his argumentf he cites State v. Chestnut,
Utah, 621 P.2d 1228f 1232 (1980), in which this Court stated that
any evidence "however slight, on any reasonable theory of the
case" under which he might have been convicted of theft rather
than burglary, is sufficient to warrant the jury instruction on
theft.

Defendant interprets this statement to mean that if he can
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invent any theory of the case that is supported by even the most
far-fetched view of the evidence, the trial court has no
discretion to deny his requested lesser included offense
instruction.

This reasoning ignores both the plain language of

the statute and the case law, including HakfiXf interpreting the
statute.
The Baker this Court characterized the evidence-based
standard as follows:

"When the elements of two offenses overlap

• . . , if there is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a
jury question regarding the lesser offense, then the court should
instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense."

EaJifii at 159.

The second step of the £aJi£X analysis requires the trial court to
decide whether a sufficient quantum of evidence has been presented
to justify sending the question to the jury.

Even Chestnut, which

defendant cites for its "any evidence" language, requires the
court to determine whether there is any evidence on any reasonable
theory of the case - in other words, whether the defendant's
theory of the case is reasonable.

"It is the prerogative and the

responsibility of the trial court to make the preliminary
determination as to what offense reasonable minds might find from
the evidence."

State v. Lopez. Utah, 626 P.2d 483, 486 (1981).

In State v. Tucker, Utah, 618 P.2d 46 (1980), this Court discussed
§ 76-1-402(4) and stated that "ti]n deciding whether or not such a
rational basis exists, the trial court must necessarily be
accorded a certain amount of discretion."

JLd. at 50.

That such discretion exists in the trial court is
confirmed by the holdings of the cases applying § 76-1-402(4).
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In

several cases both before and after fLaJteJLr this court has affirmed
the trial court's finding of a lack of a sufficient quantum of
evidence to warrant the requested jury instruction regardless of
the fact that sims. evidence on the defendant's theory of the case
was presented.

In State v. Tucker, su^za,

this Court held that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there
was no rational basis in the evidence to support the defendant's
requested jury instruction on joy-riding as a lesser included
offense of theft of a motor vehicle.

The trial court declined to

give the instruction even though the defendant testified that he
had intended to return the car, but when the police began to
pursue him, he panicked and tried to escape.

In State v. Lopez,

supraf this Court affirmed the appellant's conviction of second
degree murder.

The trial court had refused to give a jury

instruction on the lesser included offense of the variation of
manslaughter which proscribes the killing of another under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there was a reasonable explanation.

The jury instruction was

refused despite the defendant's testimony that the fight in which
the victim was killed was a result of an earlier argument between
the defendant and the victim.

In State v. Clayton, Utah, 658 P.2d

624 (1983), this Court affirmed the defendant's conviction of
attempted second degree murder.

The defendant had testified that

he and the victim had had a fight fifteen minutes before the
shooting, and that he shot the victim to protect himself against
an anticipated knife attack.

He then claimed that this testimony

provided evidence that he killed the victim either in the
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heat of passion or in the reasonable belief that the circumstances
provided a moral or legal justification for his conduct.
Nonetheless, the trial court found no rational basis for the jury
to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather than murder,
and refused to give the lesser included offense jury instruction.
In State v. Shabata. Utah, 678 P.2d 791 (1984), the trial court
refused to give the defendant's requested jury instruction on
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second degree murder
because his theory of the case precluded the instruction.

This

Court affirmed the conviction and said in dicta that the evidence
that the defendant had had an affair with the victim's wife would
not have been sufficient to warrant giving the instruction.

In

each of the foregoing cases, there was some evidence to support
the defendant's claim of entitlement to a lesser included offense
jury instruction.

Nevertheless, in each case the trial court

determined in its discretion that there was no rational basis in
the evidence to warrant the requested instruction, and in each
case this Court affirmed.
Thus the trial court has discretion to decide whether
the evidence supporting the defendant's theory of the case meets
the second prong of the Jiak&r test; i.e., constitutes a sufficient
quantum of evidence to provide a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the greater and convicting him of the
lesser offense.

It therefore follows that a trial court ruling on

a lesser included offense instruction should be reversed only for
in abuse of that discretion.
ibuse of discretion.

In the case at bar there was no such

The evidence to which defendant points to
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support his contention that his entry into the back room of the
Handy Pantry was licensed does not constitute the required
rational basis to acquit him of burglary and convict him of theft.
It is true that the Handy Pantry was open to the public at the
time of the burglary and that the door to the back room was open.
Howeverr it is undisputed that the back room was in fact not open
to the public.

Furthermore, defendant and all other patrons of

the store were on notice of this fact.

One of the reasons that

the trial court is accorded discretion in this determination is
that it requires an evaluation of the evidence.

The trial judge,

who is present during the testimony and the presentation of the
physical evidence, is therefore more qualified than an appellate
court to perform this function.

In the instant case Judge Banks

was able to view the evidence of the photographs of the door
leading to the back room and the signs posted on that door.

In

denying defendants motion to dismiss, Judge Banks said
Well, it is obvious from the photographs
and the testimony that this was not a portion
of the building open to the public in spite
of the sign itself, and I donft have any
trouble reading that sign walking straight
back from even this photograph . . .
It is
obvious that that is not a portion of the
building open to the public. Your shelves
and so forth on the outside and the
appearance as you enter the door itself shows
an office space there. It is a retail store.
Your motion is denied.
(T. 119). Morever, although it is true that the store's only
bathroom was located in the back room, there was no evidence that
defendant was even aware of that fact.
Most important, in all of the cases in which this Court
has held that the evidence adduced at trial warranted the giving
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of a lesser included offense jury instruction, the holding has
explicitly rested at least in part on the fact that the
defendant's testimony provided some of the evidence supporting his
theory of the case. ££&, e.g., State v, Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 23 P.
349 (1924) (in view of the defendant's testimony which was in
irreconcilable conflict with that of the prosecuting witness, the
jury should have been instructed on assault as a lesser included
offense of assault with intent to commit rape); State v. Gillianf
23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970) (the defendant's testimony
that she was in such a state of emotional upset that she fired
shots into a room to scare her boyfriend was evidence that would
allow the jury to find her guilty of manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of first degree murder); State v. Close, 28 Utah
2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972) (the defendant's testimony that he and
the victim were never by themselves, corroborated by the victim's
sister, was evidence providing a basis which would justify a
verdict of guilty of simply assault as a lesser included offense
of indecent assault); State v. Chestnutf supra (the defendant's
testimony that he had tried to awaken the motorcycle's owner to
ask permission to ride it and that he had intended to return the
motorcycle was part of the evidence placing his intent to deprive
the owner of the motorcyle in doubt, warranting a jury instruction
m joyriding as a lesser included offense of theft of a motor
vehicle); State v. Elliott. Utah, 641 P.2d 122 (1982) (the
evidence adduced at trial, particularly the defendants' testimony,
.n which they admitted commission of

assault but denied

:ommission of sodomy or intent to commit sodomy, established a
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rational basis for a verdict acquitting them of aggravated sexual
assault and convicting them of the lesser included offenses of
assault or aggravated assault); State v. Oldroyd. Utah, 685 P.2d
551 (1984) (given the defendant's testimony that the gun was
unloaded and that he did not point the gun at the police officers,
his intent to threaten the officers was clearly in dispute and a
jury could rationally acquit him of aggravated assault and convict
him of threatening with a dangerous weapon); and State v. Brownf
supra, (the defendant's testimony that the victim started the
fight and injured him and that his only response was to bite her,
although not particularly credible, was evidence that would permit
the jury to acquit him of aggravated kidnapping and convict him of
assault.*)
In the present case, defendant not only did not
testify, but did not even present any evidence to support his
theory of the case.

His bald assertions on appeal that the signs

prohibiting entry into the back room were not noticeable and that

* The Brown holding is confusing, however, because it seems to
rely on a different standard for the second prong of the Baker
test than that used in any other cases. As shown previously, all
other lesser included offense cases, including a case decided
after EraSil], State v. Smith, No. 18839, slip op. (Utah May 10,
1985), require either "a sufficient quantum of evidence to
provide a rational M s l s to acquit of the greater and convict of
the lesser" (emphasis added) or "any evidence or any reasonable
theory of the case." (emphasis added). In Rismn, however, this
Court states the standard thus: "the judge's sole function is to
determine whether there is gny evidence that, if believed by the
jury, would permit the jury to acquit the defendant of the
greater offense and convict defendant of the lesser." Brown at
590. Respondent submits that the Brown standard is inconsistent
with the statute, § 76-1-402(4) (see BxflMH dissent), and urges
this Court to affirm the "rational basis" standard as the correct
one.
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therefore he was licensed to enter are completely unsupported by
any evidence, as is shown by Judge Banks1 observation at trialf
quoted £U£JLa.

As the Arizona Supreme Court commented, "a

defendant is entitled to instructions on the lesser offenses if a
reasonable interpretation of the evidence indicates that he could
be guilty of those offenses • • . [however] . . • [tlhe law does
not require instructions on all offenses theoretically included in
every criminal information based on the possibility that the jury
might simply disbelieve the State's evidence."

State v. Wilson,

113 Ariz. 363, 367, 555 P.2d 321, 325 (1976).

Since there was no

evidence providing a rational basis to both acquit defendant of
burglary and convict him of theft, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying defendant's request for a jury
instruction on theft as a lesser included offense of burglary.
Therefore, the defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF BURGLARY.
At trial, after the State rested its case, defendant

tioved t o dismiss the charge, claiming t h a t the S t a t e f a i l e d to
present sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of
burglary (T. 116). The trial court denied the motion (T. 119),
m d on appeal defendant claims that this denial constituted
reversible error.

Defendant argues that the State failed to

>resent sufficient evidence of two elements of burglary; the act
»f unlawful entry, and the intent to commit a theft at the time of
ntry.

There was more than sufficient evidence to establish both

f the above elements of burglary.
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A.

THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO ESTABISH THE ELEMENT
OF UNLAWFUL ENTRY.

Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove
that he even entered the back room, because no witnesses were
produced who saw him either present in the back room, or enter or
exit the back room.

While no direct evidence was presented, there

was sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendant's entry into
the back room to warrant denying his motion to dismiss and
submitting the case to the jury.

Lorna Strasberg, a Handy Pantry

employee, said she had placed the stolen envelope on a desk in the
back room on the morning

of the burglary (T. 10). Two other

Handy Pantry employees, Valerie Swaner and Creed Anderson, saw
defendant in the store on the day of the burglary (T. 36, 45).
Ordena Longton said she and defendant were at the store on the day
of the burglary, and that when defendant came out of the store he
had the stolen envelope in his possession (T. 52, 55). Under Utah
law, since defendant was in possession of the stolen property and
did not offer a satisfactory explanation of this possession, the
jury was allowed to infer that he committed the burglary (see jury
instruction #18, Appendix).

The circumstantial evidence, coupled

with the inference legally allowed from the evidence, was
sufficient to warrant submission to the jury of the issue of
defendant's entry into the back room.
Defendant next argues that the State failed to present
evidence that if he did enter the back room, his entry was
unlawful.

It is not clear whether defendant is claiming that his

entry was authorized because the back room was actually open to
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the public, or because he did not receive notice that the back
room was closed to the public.

In either case, defendant's

contention is unsupported by the evidence.
It is true that as a matter of law entry into areas
open to the public cannot be unlawful.

However, several courts

have held that within a retail store open to the public,
separately secured portions of the store can be considered off
limits to the public so that entry into those areas is
unauthorized.

In Leppek v. State. 636 P.2d 1117 (Wyo. 1981), the

defendant was convicted of burglary when he entered a basement
storeroom in a drugstore.

The defendant argued on appeal that it

was legally impossible to commit burglary of a store that was open
to the public.

The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the defendant's

convictionf finding that the basement storeroom was not open to
the public since "[tlhere was no purpose for the general public to
have access to it.

The store owner testified that they

allow people to go down in the basement1.n

f

didn f t

JLd.at 1120.

In Sims

v. Statef 613 S.W.2d 820 (Ark. 1981), the defendant was convicted
of burglary when he entered the back room of a convenience store.
Even though he claimed that he was looking for a restroom, the
court upheld his conviction saying that "the back room was not
open to the public because the door was closed and marked
'employees only'."

Id. at 821.

It is clear from these cases that a separately secured
portion of a retail store can be closed to the public and
"therefore be the object of a burglary.

In the present case

>reston Tholen, the owner of the Handy Pantry, testified that the
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back room is off limits to the public and that no one but
employees are allowed to enter it (T. 22, 28). Additionally, the
evidence showed a sign posted on the door to the back room that
unambiguously gave notice of that fact (T. 27). That this
evidence was sufficient to show that the back room was not in fact
open to the public is confirmed by Judge Banks1 comments in
denying defendant's motion to dismiss, quoted supra.
Defendant also seems to argue that even if the back
room was closed to the public, he was not given notice of that
fact, and therefore his entry was licensed and lawful.

In a case

similar to the case at bar, Hanson v. State. 52 Wis.2d 396, 190
N.W.2d 129 (1971), in appealing his burglary conviction, the
defendant tried to argue that the State had failed to prove that
he knew that his entry was without consent.

The Wisconsin Supreme

Court upheld his conviction and said:
[Defendant] would have the state assume the
burden of showing [his] state of mind. In
the circumstances of this case, it is
apparent that the burden was not upon the
state to show that the defendant did not know
that his entry was without consent . . . In
this case there was no consent in fact. The
defendant's state of mind is irrelevant
because he makes no assertion that he assumed
he had consent. . . . Unless the defendant
makes some attempt to explain away the
evidence that there was no consent in fact,
the state has no obligation to assert or
prove the subjective state of the defendant's
mind. The evidence makes it clear, and the
trial judge so held, that the defendant knew
that no consent had been granted, and under
the facts of this case, no additional proof
was required.
Hanson at 132-33.

Although Hanson involved interpretation of a

statute defining consent, the same reasoning applies in the case
at bar.
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In the instant case, defendant argues for the first
time on appeal that because the store's bathroom was located in
the back room his entry into the back room might have been to find
a bathroom and that therefore the State should have been required
to prove that he received notice that his entry was not licensed.
However, he made no attempt at trial to explain away the evidence
that there was no consent in fact or to assert that he believed
that his entry was licensed.

Therefore, the State should not be

required to show the subjective state of defendant's mind.
Moreover, the trial judge, who was present during the
testimony and presentation of physical evidence, including
photographs, was best qualified to decide this issue.

Judge

Banks' comments, quoted supra, indicate that the evidence adduced
at trial was sufficient to submit to the jury the issue of whether
defendant received notice.

The jury instruction on burglary (see

jury instruction #19, Appendix) required the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant entered the Handy Pantry back room
Doth unlawfully and knowinglyP and the jury found defendant
juilty.

Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to warrant

submitting to the jury the issue of defendant's unlawful entry,
tnd the trial judge was correct in denying defendant's motion to
tismiss.
B.

THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH DEFENDANT'S
INTENT TO COMMIT THEFT AT THE
TIME OF HIS UNLAWFUL ENTRY.

Defendant argues that the State failed to present prima
acie evidence that when he unlawfully entered the back room, he
id so with the intent to commit a theft or other felony.
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In

State v. Brooks. Utah, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (1981), this Court stated
"[s]ince the intent to commit a theft is a state of mind, which is
rarely susceptible of direct proof, it can be inferred from
conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior
and experience."

Defendant claims that no such evidence of

conduct or circumstances was presented to support the inference
that he entered the back room with the requisite intent.

It is

true that he was not caught in the back room and that no one saw
him enter or leave the back room.

However, Ordena Longton

testified that immediately after leaving the Handy Pantry
defendant was in possession of the checks stolen from the back
room (T. 55). Furthermore, Merna Norwick and Sharon Spencer
testified that he was in possession of the stolen checks later
that night (T. 73, 75-76, 81, 83), and the arresting police
officers found some of the stolen items in the car he was driving
the following morning (T. 93). In BrooksP this Court stated that
in cases where there is an actual stealing the intent to steal at
the time of the unlawful entry is "apparent."

Brooks at 881.

Numerous other courts have gone further and held that the trial
court was warranted in inferring guilt from the fact that goods
stolen from the burgled building were found in possession of the
defendant (ji££, e.g. . State v. Carver. 94 Id. 677, 496 P.2d 676
(1972); State v. Talley, 112 Ariz. 268, 540 P.2d 1249 (1975)).
In People v. Renteria. 162 Ca.2d 590, 328 P.2d 266 (1958), a
California District Court of Appeals held that an inference that
the defendant had the requisite intent to steal when he entered
the burgled residence was appropriate when he was found in
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possession of items stolen from the residence and, when questioned
about the ownership of the items he gave false, evasive, and
inconsistent answers.

In the instant case, not only was defendant

found in possession of the stolen checks, but when the arresting
officers questioned him about them, he denied any knowledge of
them (T. 110).

In view of the testimony of the previously

mentioned witnesses, this answer was clearly false and evasive.
Additional evidence was adduced at trial that would
support the inference that defendant had the intent to commit
theft when he entered the back room.

Although the bank statement

was in plain view on top of a desk, the blank checks were hidden
in a box under the desk, and would require a search to be found
(T. 24, 31). Furthermore, defendant told Ordena Longton that he
knew someone who could "use" the checks (T. 55-56), and Ms.
Longton testified that defendant knew someone who could forge the
checks for a great deal of money (T. 103).

This evidence,

together with the evidence that defendant was in possession of the
stolen checks and lied about his possession, is sufficient to
establish the element of defendants intent to commit a theft at
;he time of his unlawful entry into the back room.

Therefore, the

irial court was correct in denying defendant's motion to dismiss
'or failure of the State to present a prima facie case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the judgment of the
ourt below should be affirmed.
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APPENDIX
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\Y

INSTRUCTION NO.
Utah Law provides that:

"Possession of property recently
stolen when no satisfactory explanation
of such possession is made, shall be
prima facie evidence that the person in
possession stole the property."
Thus if you
reasonable doubt,

find

that

the

from

the

defendant

stolen property, that such possession
point of

time

from

the

satisfactory explanation

theft,
of

such

and

evidence
was

in

and

beyond

possession

a
of

was not too remote in
the

defendant

possession,

then

made

no

you

may

infer from those facts that the defendant committed the theft.
You may

use

the

same

inference,

if

you

find

it

justified by the evidence, to connect the possessor of recently
stolen property with the offense of burglary.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before you
of the

crime

of

convict

Burglary,

the

/'?

defendant,

a Third

Degree

LAWRENCE
Felony,

PITTS,

you

must

find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the
following elements of that offense:
1.
in Salt

Lake

That

on or about the 4th day

County,

Utah,

the

of August, 1984,

defendant,

LAWRENCE

PITTS,

entered or remained in the building of Handy Pantry;
2.

That he did so unlawfully;

3.

That

4.

That he did so with the intent to commit a theft.

he

did

so

intentionally

or

knowingly;

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the State has proved each and every
elements, it

one of the above-mentioned

is your duty to convict

the Defendant.

On the

other hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or
more of said elements, then you should find the Defendant not
guilty.

Before you may convict the defendant of the offense
of Theft, a lesser included offense of Burglary, the State
must prove each and every one of the following elements to
your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about August 4, 1984, defendant

exercised unauthorized control over the property of Handy Pantry.
2.

With the intent to deprive Handy Pantry of the

3.

That all acts occurred in Salt Lake County, State

property.

of Utah.
If the State has proven each and every one of the
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable
doubt# then it is your duty to convict defendant of the offense
of Theft/ a lesser and included offense of Burglary in the
Information.

